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NOTES AND COMMENTS
It is to be noted, however, that such an exception, if there be one,
should be strictly limited to hospital records. The necessity in that case,
i.e. the multiplicity of entrants, is not present in the case of the usual
physician's office records, notations of physicians examining applicants
for employment and the like. Nevertheless, in such cases the other
principles mentioned above are applicable,' 3 and the evidence in the




Federal Procedure-Jurisdiction of Federal Courts-
Appointment of Ancillary Receivers.
There is a firmly established rule that a federal court has jurisdiction
of an ancillary proceeding, regardless of the citizenship of the parties,
the amount in controversy, or any other factor that ordinarily would
determine jurisdiction, provided the court bad jurisdiction of the prin-
cipal suit.1 In the case of Mitchell v. Maurer,2 the Supreme Court of
the United States raised two questions regarding the application of the
rule, which, it stated, did not appear to have been decided by that Court,
and which it declined to decide, as unnecessary to the disposition of the
problem presented. First-may the rule ever be applied to a proceeding
brought in the federal court of another district? Secondly-if so, is a
Co., 60 S. W. (2d) 730 (Mo. App. 1933) ; Pickering v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App.
401, 183 N. E. 301 (1930).
Douler v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 143 App. Div. 537, 128 N. Y. S.
396 (1911) (records of doctors and nurses admitted as past recorded recollec-
tion) ; Adler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 F. (2d) 827 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929)
(office record of deceased physician admitted as regular entry) ; New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Bullock, 59 F. (2d) 747 (S. D. Fla. 1932) (physician's medical history
card admitted as regular entry) ; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission,
88 Colo. 113, 293 Pac. 342 (1930) (examining physician's report made in connec-
tion with laborer's application for employment admitted as regular entry) ; Leburn
v. Boston & M. R. R., 83 N. H. 293, 142 Atl. 128 (1928) (report of employer's
physician who examined plaintiff after former injury admissible as regular entry) ;
cf. Simmons v. Means, 8 Smedes & M. 397 (Miss. 1847) (physician's account book
admitted) ; Clark v. Smith, 46 Barb. 30 (N. Y. 1866) (physician's books admissible
to show number of calls made by him). A collection of cases bearing on the
admissibility of physician's records to show birth, death, etc. will be found in
Note L. R. A. 1915 F. 803. There seems to be a split of authority over the ad-
missibility o.f physicians' death certificates. Cases on this point are collected in
Note (1922) 17 A. L. R. 359.
u It is not clear, however, upon what principle the evidence was admitted. The
following is quoted from the opinion: "The doctor's notations on the card were
admissible as a part of the res gestae of the plaintiff's application for work. They
were shown to have been made under circumstances making it reasonably appar-
ent that they truly represented the facts they purported to set down. They are in
effect declarations by the plaintiff himself that he was fit and able to work."
73 F. (2d) at 473.
12 HUGHES, FEDERA PRocEnuRE (1931) §1192.
255 Sup. Ct. 162 (1934).
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proceeding for the appointment of ancillary receivers in another federal
district an ancillary suit within the meaning of the rule?
In the principal case, primary receivers appointed by a state court
had petitioned for the appointment of ancillary feceivers in the federal
district court in another state. The Circuit Court of Appeals8 had
affirmed the appointment made by the District Court, remarking 4 that
"an ancillary suit in a federal court does not depend on diverse citizen-
ship". The Supreme Court reversed the decree, on the ground that the
requisite diversity of citizenship was lacking,5 and stated that the posi-
tion of the Circuit Court was unsound, in view of the fact that the
primary appointment was made by a state court. The opinion, however,
expressly recognizes the rule as applicable to proceedings in intervention,
and to independent suits which are ancillary to an original suit in the
same court.6
It is to be noted that the questions raised refer to federal, not equity
jurisdiction,7 and are not coincidental with the question of the power
of a receiver to sue out of the district of his appointment.8
Statements such as that of the Circuit Court of Appeals apparently
find their origin in authority in a dictum of the Circuit Court of Appeals
in Bluefields S. S. Co. v. Steele.9 That dictum clearly answers both
questions raised by the Supreme Court in the principal case in the
affirmative. The Court said, "While an ancillary proceeding of the
kind here considered [a proceeding for the appointment of an ancillary
receiver] will be controlled by the court before which it is prosecuted,
and in that sense is an independent proceeding, its ultimate object is to
aid the purpose of the original suit, and in that sense it is ancillary.
Jurisdiction in such an ancillary suit therefore no more depends on
diversity of citizenship than it does in a suit ancillary to an original
suit pending in the same court." It will be noticed, however, that the
Court, during the course of its discussion of this point, cited but one
case'--one which does not support its proposition.
869 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934). 'Id. at 238.
' One of the three primary receivers was a citizen of Delaware, as was the
defendant insurance company. This point was apparently relied upon at no stage
of the proceedings, but was looked to by the Supreme Court on its own motion.
655 Sup. Ct. 162, 164 (1934), citing Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Indianapolis,
etc., Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 107, 46 Sup. Ct. 221, 70 L. ed. 490 (1926), and White v.
Ewing, 159 U. S. 36, 15 Sup. Ct. 1018, 40 L. ed. 67 (1895).
'For cases illustrating aspects of the latter problem, see, for example, Blue-
fields S. S. Co. v. Steele, 184 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911) ; Walker v. U. S. Light
& 'Heating Co., 220 Fed. 393 (S. D. N. Y., 1915) ; Trustees System Co. of Pa. v.
Payne, 65 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
' See Note (1906) 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 824; HIGH, REcntvEs (4th ed. 1910)
271-85.
'184 Fed. 584, 587 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911).
"Southern Ry. Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257, 20 Sup. Ct. 347,
44 L. ed. 458 (1900).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
On the other side is the decision in Winter v. Swuinburne.11 It was
there held that a creditors' bill could not be prosecuted in the circuit
court in aid of an execution on a money decree recovered in the district
court (in the same district) in admiralty, or for enforcement or collec-
tion of such a decree, all parties being citizens of the same state. The
Court based its conclusion upon the premise that the rule--that "where
a bill filed on the equity side of the court is not an original suit, but
ancillary and dependent, jurisdiction is maintained without regard to
the citizenship of the parties"-applied only where the ancillary bill
was filed in the same court. The cases cited by the Court were illus-
trative of the rule as applied to proceedings which were in fact in the
same court, but none of them required that the proceedings all be in
the same court. The opinion expressly admits that "direct adjudication
of the precise question involved is wanting."' 1  Since the facts are so
clearly distinguishable, we are again left with the bare, abstract propo-
sition that the first question should be answered in the negative.
With such a paucity of judicial expression upon the problem, it
remains one requiring all the considerations of logic and policy attending
one of first impression. As to the second question, it is difficult to per-
ceive why, if suits by and against a receiver, as such, in the court of his
appointment are ancillary,' 3 such suits in the court of another district
would be any the less So.14  Further, if, in order to maintain such
suits in a foreign district, ancillary appointment is necessary,15 why
is not the petition for such appointment clearly ancillary to the purpose
of the principal action? To hold otherwise would be to put a new con-
notation upon the word itself.' 6 To that extent, the Court in the Blue-
fields Case would seem to be upon safe ground.
If the second question is to be answered in the affirmative, no very
cogent arguments present themselves for answering the first otherwise,
especially where the question involves courts of the same sovereign. An
action, having the requisite elements to give a federal district court
jurisdiction, can be brought as well in one district as in another, pro-
vided, of course, that the improper venue is waived.17 If that is so,
either of-say-two district courts could take jurisdiction of the prin-
cipal suit, and the one having jurisdiction of the principal suit would
8 Fed. 49 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1881).
Id. at 52.
HIGH, RECEIVERS (4th ed. 1910) §§60a-b; 2 HUGHES, FEDERAL PROCEDURE
(1931) §§1205, 1208.
1 See Conklin v. U. S. Shipbuilding Co., 123 Fed. 913, 917 (C. C. Me. 1903).
312 HUGHES, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1931) §1213.
1 BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933).
A well-established principle, impliedly recognized by the Court in the
principal case, 55 Sup. Ct. 162, 165 (1934). Also, 3 HUGHES, FEDERAL PROcEDURE
(1931) §2223.
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then have jurisdiction also of the ancillary proceedings, regardless of
the usual requisites for federal jurisdiction in the latter. In view of that
situation, would it not be a bit incongruous to hold that, if one district
court had jurisdiction of the principal suit, the other could not rely
upon that jurisdiction to sustain the ancillary proceedings brought
before it? Policy would seem to demand that the district courts stand
in readiness to aid one another without undue formality, and that, as
long as the system of equity receiverships exists, it be given every assis-
tance to the speedy and efficient accomplishment of its purpose.' 8
D. W. MARKHAM.
Mortgages-Contract of Assumption-Consideration.
A certain E. C. Vest was heavily indebted to various persons. Some
of these creditors held first and second mortgages on two lots owned
by him; the rest were unsecured. In order to put this property beyond
the reach of the latter group, he conveyed it to his mother-in-law, Mrs.
Booth; and, apparently for the purpose of creating the appearance of a
sufficient consideration, she assumed the secured debts. She then recon-
veyed by warranty deed to her daughter, Mrs. Vest. The property
having been sold to satisfy a prior lien, the second mortgagee makes
claim in the present suit against Mrs. Booth's estate on the agreement of
assumption.' The West Virginia court held, the promise was without
consideration and hence unenforceable 2
Under this view of the transaction, Mrs. Booth was only a con-
duit,8 and the conveyance to her was merely a sham device to get title
' Compare §56 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A. §117 (1927), and REPORT
PAMPHLET No. 1: THE AssocIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CiTY OF NEW YORK
(1926-27), ANNUAL REPORT OF SPECIAL COmmITTEE ON EquITy RECEIVERSHIP,
19-31.
'The suit was originally brought in chancery by the receiver of a bank, which
held an unsecured claim reduced to judgment against Mrs. Booth, to set aside cer-
tain conveyances made by her to her children and children-in-lav on the grounds
that they were voluntary and made without consideration and to defraud and hinder
creditors. Pending this suit, Mrs. Booth died. Thereupon, her administrator was
substituted, and he made all of her heirs and all persons making claims against
the estate parties defendant. The appellee, a second mortgagee of the lots, was
made a party as one of the latter group. She answered by setting up the claim
against the estate in her cross-bill. Brief of Appellee in the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia in the case of Lawhead v. Booth, 177 S. E. 283 (W.
Va. 1935) pages 2-5.2 Lawhead v. Booth, 177 S. E. 283 (W. Va. 1935). The sole authority cited by
the court was 1 W.Lrso N, CoNTRACrs (1920) §394, which says that a promisor of
a third party beneficiary contract may set up want of consideration as a defense
to a suit by the beneficiary.
* The so-called "conduit" cases are, however, not in point. They deal with the
problem of the attaching of liens upon the property of the conduit. Stow v. Tifft,
15 Johns. 458 (N. Y. 1818) (Does dower attach to the interest of a purchase
money mortgagor?); Mills v. Van Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412 (1859).
